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Jedenfalls ist es ein hermeneutisches Gebot, 
nicht so sehr über Grade der Übersetzbarkeit, 
wie über Grade der Unübersetzbarkeit nachzudenken. 
(Gadamer 1993, 279) 
 
[In any event it is a hermeneutic imperative 
to reflect not so much on degrees of translatability 
as on degrees of untranslatability.] 
 
Approaching Untranslatability 
Untranslatability has always been both a philosophical problem, and a problem for philosophy. It 
is both a question that philosophy asks of translation (what are the limits of translation?), and a 
question that translation asks of philosophy (to what extent is philosophy itself translatable?). In 
the second half of this essay I will broach the second question, the challenge to philosophy posed 
by questions of translation and translatability, but I will begin by addressing the first, and attempt 
a definition of untranslatability. 
Any attempt to define untranslatability is obliged to map the contours of the translatable, 
to delimit its furthest extent, and that in turn presupposes a definition of translation itself. 
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Untranslatability, then, quickly leads to the heart of translation, indeed some would argue that it 
is the most urgent question one can ask, for the untranslatable begins where translation (and 
translatability) ends. Put that way, it sounds as though we are faced with one of those old maps 
of Africa with a swath of terra incognita marked on it as a heart of blankness (cf. Holmes 1988, 
64), or perhaps even an old sea-chart where untranslatability is the monster lying in wait for the 
unwary in the uncharted waters off the benign, obliging coast of agreed meaning (here be 
dragons!). In practice, though, the line of demarcation marking the difference between the 
translatable and the untranslatable, between translation and non-translation, is never that clear-
cut: things are much messier, for nothing is ever off limits to the translator in this way. In 
practice, with even the thorniest crux (such as rhymes or wordplay – see Delabastita 1997) it is 
always possible for a translator to at least make a stab at a translation, and a translator will 
usually circle round a problematic passage making multiple attempts. Now we are used to 
thinking of this as a question of gradations along a scale (whether it be a scale of accuracy or 
adequacy, of equivalence or acceptability), but at what point (if any?) does a difference of degree 
or quantity (less and less good translations, less and less good approximations to the original) 
turn into a difference of kind or quality (i.e. not just “that has not been translated well” but “that 
has not been translated”), and at what point after that does a difference of contingent actuality 
(“this has or has not been translated”) turn into a difference of universal potentiality (“this is 
translatable or untranslatable”)? That is (ultimately) a philosophical decision, but I would 
suggest that it is not always even arrived at. 
In practice the notion of untranslatability is probably most often invoked when a 
translator despairs of solving a translation problem, and – perhaps dissatisfied with their multiple 
attempts at a solution – throws up their hands with a cry of “it’s impossible to translate!” We 
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encounter the notion of untranslatability, then, when an individual translator makes (or, better, 
tries to make) the move from “I can’t translate this” to “This is untranslatable.” In other words 
they extrapolate from a perception of their own individual failure to a structural impossibility. 
Untranslatability in this sense simply functions as an excuse: it can be invoked by the individual 
translator from time to time, but it is tantamount to a concession of defeat, and hardly something 
to be celebrated. The untranslatable functions as a kind of “God of the gaps” (an omnipotent 
deity invoked in order to shore up any incomplete explanations), and this “God of the gaps” in 
turn functions as a deus ex machina absolving the translator of their core responsibility, to 
produce an adequate version. Is that move ever legitimate, or is it always just a reassuring (if 
self-deluding) cop-out? 
Strictly speaking, the question of untranslatability arises only at the point where someone 
(whether the translator herself or someone else) determines two things: not only, firstly, that the 
efforts that have been made to translate a passage so far do not constitute a translation – or, in the 
weak form of the claim, an adequate translation – but also, secondly, that no amount of further 
effort could ever produce one. Put like that, the impossible extent of the claim that is 
untranslatability becomes apparent. The concept of untranslatability is an affront to translators 
(which is why it is routinely resisted). It is premised on the ultimate assessment of translation 
quality, which is the assessment of whether a passage does or does not deserve to be qualified as 
a translation at all (“it’s not a translation”). Now we are usually loath to make even that first 
move, to go from “this is a poor translation” to “this is not a translation”: practising translators 
rarely, if ever, describe something as “not a translation”; instead they deal in gradations. But – 
for all that Hans-Georg Gadamer, in my epigraph quotation, writes of “degrees of 
untranslatability” (Gadamer 1993, 279) – the discourse of untranslatability presupposes a hard-
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and-fast distinction between translation and not-translation, so that untranslatability emerges as a 
foolish, unworkable term because it conjures up merely a binary opposition rather than a cline. 
Faced with a particularly tricky translation problem such as a piece of rhymed verse, translators 
will want to break down the problem into constituent parts and may ultimately conclude that they 
cannot translate some of these parts, but that is far from asserting that the poem as a whole is 
untranslatable (let alone that poetry as a genre is untranslatable), and that the version of the poem 
that results does not count as a translation at all. 
We need to come down off our rigorist high horse and acknowledge that the very notion 
of “untranslatability” is usually used to designate something which cannot be translated 
adequately or satisfactorily rather than not translated at all (which does not really make any 
sense). Here is John Sallis offering a milder, more pragmatic definition of untranslatability itself: 
 
there is no poem of which one can say in advance that every would-be translation of it 
will prove disentitled as such, will prove to be unentitled to be called a translation. If, 
nonetheless, attestations to the untranslatability of poetry abound, what is attested can 
only be a more limited untranslatability. In whatever way the attestations are framed, 
regardless of how unconditionally they may be stated, the untranslatability of poetry thus 
attested can consist only in poetry’s not being translatable without loss and without the 
flattening and distortion generally that is produced by such loss. (Sallis 2002, 112-13) 
 
On this analysis, then, we never actually mean it when we say something is “untranslatable.” It is 
an empty intensifier on a par with “unbelievable” (which I always cross out in student essays). It 
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is meaningless to the practical translator, who will always want to rise to its implicit challenge 
and will rarely, if ever, want to admit defeat. 
In this context one might be forgiven for wondering how the notion of untranslatability 
even arose in the first place, since we seem to have dismissed the concept before we have even 
begun discussing it. This approach treats untranslatability as so much metaphysical stuff and 
nonsense, to be dismissed by a more down-to-earth, common-sensical approach, reminiscent of 
Dr Johnson dismissing Bishop Berkeley’s idealism by kicking a large stone (Boswell 1986, 122). 
There is something robustly anti-philosophical (detractors would say, unkindly, pre-
philosophical) about this approach, which dismisses untranslatability as merely one of the 
nocturnal monsters brought forth unnecessarily by the sleep of reason. If it takes a (nodding) 
philosopher to even come up with the idea, perhaps untranslatability is merely a dispensable 
philosophical distraction? 
Any theory of untranslatability has to begin by acknowledging that, as Paul Ricœur puts 
it, “there is translation” (Ricœur 2006, 32), or as George Steiner argues: “We do translate intra- 
and interlingually and have done so since the beginning of human history. The defence of 
translation has the immense advantage of abundant, vulgar fact” (Steiner 1998, 264). As 
Anthony Pym and Horst Turk remark, “the key to the debate is the relative looseness with which 
the concept of translation is used” (Pym and Turk 1998, 276). Untranslatability can always be 
banished, with a wave of the hand, by the simple expedient of abandoning any hard-line 
conception of what translation itself is, and instead acknowledging that real-world translation is 
all about compromise, that translation is a craft, a techne (cf. Biguenet and Schulte 1989), and 
the no-nonsense translator is an artisan who at the first hint of untranslatability perhaps makes 
the sign of the cross, but certainly reaches for his trusty tools and gets to work banishing 
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untranslatability with every stroke of the pen or touch of the keyboard. This is the picture 
conjured up by Antoine Berman writing at the end of his magisterial overview of (the 
untranslatable in) German Romantic translation theory, The Experience of the Foreign: 
 
To be sure, every text is written in a language; and in fact, the multiplicity of terms 
mentioned, whether it appears in a written or an oral sequence, remains in itself 
“untranslatable” in the sense that the other language will not have the corresponding 
terms. But at the level of a work, the problem is not to know whether or not there are 
equivalents for these terms. Because the level of translatability is different. […] The 
alleged untranslatability is dissolved in total translatability [traduisibilité sans reste] by 
simply having recourse to modes of relation that exist naturally and historically between 
languages, but adapted in this case to the demands of the translation of a text. (Berman 
1992, 189 [1984, 302]) 
 
Berman then details different practical translation strategies – borrowing, neologism, non-
translation, compensation, displacement, homologous replacement – before concluding: 
 
These are not, as one tends to believe, makeshift procedures, but modalities that define 
the meaning itself of all literary translation, inasmuch as it encounters what is 
linguistically (and sometimes culturally) untranslatable and dissolves it in actual literary 
translatability [réelle traduisibilité littéraire] without, of course, slipping into paraphrase 




For Berman, then, translation is eminently equipped to extend the boundaries of the 
translatable and reclaim some of that uncharted territory mentioned above, cutting back the 
teeming undergrowth of “alleged untranslatability” with its machete in the form of a suitable 
translation strategy. This upbeat conclusion to Berman’s study is echoed already by Roman 
Jakobson in his seminal 1959 article “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” Here Jakobson 
peremptorily dismisses what he terms “the dogma of untranslatability,” and counters with: 
 
All cognitive experience and its classification is conveyable in any existing language. 
Whenever there is deficiency, terminology may be qualified and amplified by loan-words 
or loan-translations, neologisms or semantic shifts, and finally, by circumlocutions. […] 
No lack of grammatical device in the language translated into makes impossible a literal 
translation of the entire conceptual information contained in the original. […] Any 
assumption of ineffable or untranslatable cognitive data would be a contradiction in 
terms. (Jakobson 2012, 128-29) 
 
The Romantic Untranslatable / The Romance of the Untranslatable 
Can untranslatability be quite so easily conjured away, though? As Kirsten Malmkjær has 
pointed out, in the very same essay where Jakobson apparently argues “all is translatable,” he 
also explicitly claims that “poetry by definition is untranslatable” (Malmkjær 2015, 192). Juliane 
House also picks up on this contradiction, and counters what she calls Jakobson’s “‘law of 
universal translatability’” by dwelling on “a few exceptions to universal translatability” (House 
2015, 51). She lists three different kinds of exception, namely connotative meanings, “whenever 
the form of a linguistic unit takes on special importance” (particularly in poetry, and in literary 
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translation more generally), and intralinguistic variation (dialect). There is a very slippery slope 
leading from such piecemeal concessions to untranslatability for specific aspects of texts, to 
claims of untranslatability for entire text types, such as Jakobson’s “poetry by definition is 
untranslatable.” Perhaps, then, we have been a little premature in dismissing untranslatability? 
Perhaps we have not been describing every possible situation? Perhaps we have just been in 
denial? 
Writing on Schleiermacher’s celebrated lecture “On the Different Methods of 
Translating,” Malmkjær points out that his “unquestioning faith in translatability” (2015, 189) is 
associated with what Schleiermacher calls (and loftily dismisses as) “interpreting” (Dolmetschen, 
the preserve of the business world) rather than “[true] translation” (Übersetzen, pertaining to the 
areas of scholarship and the arts), which Schleiermacher finds much more problematic and can 
even lead one to frustrated despair. This despair (Verzweiflung) at ever actualising what one 
might term, following Kant, the conditions of possibility for “true translation” (die eigentliche 
Übersetzung) is formulated by Schleiermacher in terms of the hermeneutic imperative to 
understand the source text author: 
 
If his [the translator’s] readers are to understand [verstehen], then they must grasp the 
genius [Geist] of the language that was native [einheimisch] to the writer, they must be 
able to observe his characteristic manner of thinking and sensibility [dessen 
eigenthümliche Denkweise und Sinnesart]; and all he can offer them as a help for 
achieving these two things is their own language, corresponding in none of its parts to the 
other tongue, along with himself, as he has recognised his writer now the more, now the 
less lucidly, and as he admires and applauds the writer’s work now more, now less. Does 
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not translation appear, viewed in this way, an utterly foolish undertaking [ein thörichtes 
Unternehmen]? (Schleiermacher 2012, 47 [Störig 1963, 45]) 
 
In her reading of this lecture Malmkjær argues that we should characterise Schleiermacher as 
only a “reluctant Romantic” (Malmkjær 2015, 189), but this concern with the “characteristic” or 
“peculiar” (eigenthümlich) is itself peculiarly Romantic, and in line with the movement’s 
concern with artistic individuality, idiosyncrasy and genius. In this respect one can readily range 
Schleiermacher alongside Wilhelm von Humboldt, for example, arguing in 1816 that 
Aeschylus’s Agamemnon is untranslatable “because of its peculiar nature” (Lefevere 1977, 40; 
“seiner eigenthümlichen Natur nach”: Störig 1963, 80), or Schopenhauer arguing in his 1851 
essay “On Language and Words”: “One cannot translate poems, only transpose them […] 
because the foreign language denotes the concept by means of a trope or metaphor which is 
peculiar to it” (Lefevere 1977, 98-99; “einen ihr eigenthümlichen Tropus, oder Metapher”: Störig 
1963, 105). 
In their pessimistic assumptions of untranslatability, philosophising translation in a minor 
key, these theorists wear their Romanticism on their sleeves in another respect, as well, for such 
translation theory seems to me to be haunted, and in two senses. On the one hand it is haunted by 
the prospect of there being some kind of “translation proper” which lies ever elsewhere and does 
not correspond to the kind of translation one might actually be doing at any one time, and on the 
other by the conviction that – ironically, paradoxically – such “translation proper” might actually 
be constituted by untranslatability. This pessimistic, idealist take on translatability proceeds from 
the recognition that all the translation we do here on earth is somehow tainted; by the mere fact 
that it pragmatically succeeds it is dismissed as not really translation – what one might call, by 
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analogy with the “no true Scotsman fallacy” (Flew 1975, 47), “the no true translation move.” 
Untranslatability haunts the practical translator as a kind of anxiety, so that just as Max Weber’s 
Calvinist is haunted by the fear that he might not number among God’s chosen at the end of the 
day (at the end of days) (Weber 2001, 65), so the Romantic translator is haunted by the idea that 
“Perhaps my text is untranslatable after all?” That there is a radical, absolute untranslatability out 
there – an incommensurability between languages and between the humans who speak and use 
them – which cannot be bridged by practical means. That translation is not only unattainable, but 
ultimately a category mistake. Such a translator might despair of the very enterprise itself 
(compare Schleiermacher’s black dog of Verzweiflung), and is even potentially paralysed by the 
effect of (the concept of) untranslatability. 
Now untranslatability arrived at from this direction is of a fundamentally different nature 
to the kind I was describing above. Previously I was approaching the question of 
untranslatability inductively, from the bottom up – personal experience of translation difficulty, 
extrapolated – and arguing that it has little currency. As we saw, the extrapolation from personal 
experience of translation difficulty need not result in a recognition of untranslatability at all, but 
usually short-circuits the passage into philosophy. By contrast Romantic translation theory 
arrives at untranslatability not inductively but deductively, from the top down. One is tempted to 
call this the properly philosophical sense of untranslatability, if that term were not so loaded, 
since ultimately any conception of “translation proper” (including Jakobson’s in 1959) is 
metaphysical, even mystical. The move from the untranslated to the untranslatable is the transit 
from empirical observation into abstract philosophy, and the gap between the two is a 
metaphysical, even theological space (see Apter 2013, 228-46). The last of the great German 
Romantic translation theorists, Walter Benjamin, will argue that translatability (and, we might 
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say, untranslatability) relates to the ontological status of a text and is an inherent property of it 
(can it be translated in principle?) rather than a contingent feature of the text-in-the-world 
(whether it has been translated) (Benjamin 2012, 76). Benjamin’s is perhaps the most hieratic 
version of this position, but it pertains to various philosophical traditions, from German 
Romanticism through to French deconstruction via currents in Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy of the mid-20th century (cf. Malmkjær in this volume). 
 
Philosophy and the Resistance to Translation 
With the philosophical question of untranslatability still unresolved (is it a meaningful term? is it 
anything other than a philosophical construct?), let us turn at this point to the second question 
which I formulated at the outset, the question which translation poses to philosophy (the issue 
raised by my title, of “The Untranslatable in Philosophy”). For in the perverse beauty contest 
which is periodically conducted to determine which text type or literary genre might count as the 
most untranslatable, poetry is not the only winner: also routinely on the podium are scripture 
(where the notion of untranslatability is ultimately not so much a metaphysical as a theological 
conception, relating to the ineffable status of the word of God), and, precisely, philosophy. Not 
least among philosophers, philosophy itself – conceptual language more generally – is often held 
up as the privileged example of an untranslatable genre: hence Schopenhauer argues, for 
example (Lefevere 1977, 99-100), that in order to understand concepts in a foreign language one 
cannot rely on translations and one is really obliged to learn that language, and Heidegger will 
advance a version of the same argument (De Gennaro 2000). Is there something specific about 
philosophy, then, which makes it more untranslatable than other text types? More resistant to 
translation? Perhaps even radically untranslatable? 
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The experience of translating two books by Friedrich Nietzsche for Oxford World’s 
Classics (Nietzsche 1998, 2007) has taught me that Nietzsche’s late style, while a joy to read in 
German, poses significant challenges to the translator and might indeed be claimed to operate in 
some respects at the limits of translatability. When he is not breaking out into actual poetry his 
prose bears all the hallmarks of a poetic style, bursting with figurative language (as the French 
philosopher Sarah Kofman explores in Nietzsche and Metaphor, the first book I translated 
[Kofman 1993]). It is deft, playful and hugely inventive, dazzlingly multilingual and intertextual, 
rhetorically highly self-aware. These stylistic pyrotechnics are not, of course, specifically 
philosophical features, and it is as well to note that Nietzsche makes a mockery of any attempt to 
somehow hive off conceptual language, to set up a prophylactic cordon sanitaire between 
philosophy and literature in order to argue that conceptual language is peculiarly philosophical 
and hence peculiarly untranslatable. No, as Nietzsche demonstrates so expertly, when 
characterising philosophical language one needs to give full force to both terms, for it is 
philosophy but it is also a language like any other, and susceptible to highly creative 
manipulation in the hands of a poetic master-craftsman. 
When people talk about the specific difficulty (and specific untranslatability) of 
philosophical language, of course, they usually mean something rather different, namely densely 
conceptual language à la Kant or Hegel, bristling with technical terms – cruces like aletheia or 
sophrosyne, Aufhebung or différance. Thankfully (from the point of view of both his readers and 
his translators), Nietzsche uses remarkably few technical terms, and from my experience of 
editing The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche for Stanford University Press (Nietzsche 
1995- ), the thorniest issue to have come up so far is what to do with the term “Übermensch.” 
The earliest English translations used “superman,” as reflected in George Bernard Shaw’s play 
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Man and Superman (1903), but once Clark Kent had muscled in on the semantic field thirty 
years later this ceased to be an option. “Overman” was in vogue for a while, as was simply 
leaving the term untranslated in German. Practical translation projects need practical solutions, 
though, and the one we have come up with for the Stanford edition (guided by our more 
overarching concern for inclusive language) is “the superhuman.” This solution emerged as a 
consensus after lengthy e-mail discussions between the two general editors and our two 
translators of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Paul S. Loeb and David Tinsley. In similar fashion we 
have produced a dynamic list of standardised term-translations to which we are still adding from 
time to time, but which we expect all (currently fourteen) of the translators of our edition to 
adhere to unless there is good reason to dissent, which they can explain in a note. Such 
standardisation by fiat is the privilege of editing a project like this, but it is also imperative in the 
sense that without such agreed principles a standard edition would never be possible. 
Before I move on from my experiences with translating and editing Nietzsche, let us note 
that this kind of practical imperative of translatability is not by any means always imposed on 
philosophers from without by unsubtle editors. Nietzsche himself published his philological 
juvenilia in Latin and then translated them into German, and many other philosophers have not 
only published work in more than one language, but – apparently largely unproblematically – 
published self-translations as a means of promoting their own work and finding a different 
audience for it, especially in the early modern period with vernacular-language philosophers 
ensuring that an edition was available in Latin (see Large 2014). Thus Francis Bacon translated 
his Essays into Latin, assisted by Thomas Hobbes, who also translated his own Leviathan into 
Latin; Descartes helped his friend Étienne de Courcelles translate his Discours de la méthode 
into Latin; Spinoza (who otherwise published only in Latin) translated his Short Treatise into 
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Dutch. As late as the mid-19th century, Schopenhauer translated his essay on the theory of 
colours from German into Latin; later on, C. S. Peirce translated some of his early articles into 
French, while Hannah Arendt translated The Human Condition into German herself, and in our 
own time some of our most exuberant philosophical translators have been self-translators, 
notably Quine (self-translating into French and Spanish) and Vilém Flusser. These are not, then, 
examples of philosophers standing on ceremony and preciously asserting that their concepts are 




Talking of getting one’s hands dirty in the name of philosophical translatability, in the final part 
of this essay I must turn to a remarkable contemporary project which has done precisely that. I 
refer, of course, to Barbara Cassin’s Dictionary of Untranslatables: this multi-authored volume 
under Cassin’s general editorship first appeared in French in 2004, as Vocabulaire européen des 
philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles (Cassin 2004), and an English version duly 
appeared a decade later, as Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (Cassin 
2014). The preposterous irony of the performative self-contradiction that is a translated 
“dictionary of untranslatables” has not been lost on anyone (and English is only one of a large 
number of languages into which it has been translated, or partially translated, from Arabic to 
Ukrainian). This is a major project in all senses, not just its level of funding, the number of its 
collaborators, its format and page extent. The original French edition includes contributions from 
leading philosophers such as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Françoise Dastur, Monique David-
Ménard and Catherine Malabou, while the English edition – edited by a team headed by Emily 
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Apter – includes additional material newly commissioned from contributors of the calibre of 
Judith Butler, Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak and Robert J. C. Young. 
Naturally enough, the Dictionary has made many waves since it was first published – and 
indeed before, given that Cassin was organising “Journées du Vocabulaire européen des 
philosophies” from a decade earlier (see Cassin 1995). For my purposes in this essay I want to 
focus in on the understanding and definition of “untranslatables” which guides the project (and 
which the English version foregrounds, where it was only in the subtitle in the original French). 
In her Introduction (included in both French and English editions), Cassin describes 
“untranslatables” as “symptoms of difference” (2014, xvii): 
 
To speak of untranslatables in no way implies that the terms in question, or the 
expressions, the syntactical or grammatical turns, are not and cannot be translated: the 
untranslatable is rather what one keeps on (not) translating [l’intraduisible, c’est plutôt ce 
qu’on ne cesse pas de (ne pas) traduire]. (Cassin 2014, xvii [2004, xvii]) 
 
A special sense of “untranslatable” emerges here which I find extremely helpful. It clearly draws 
on Derrida’s understanding of translation as impossible but necessary, caught in a double bind 
(Davis 2001). But I read the Cassin project’s defiant take on translation as an endless process of 
refinement more in the spirit of Camus (we must imagine the Sisyphean translator happy) or the 
curiously contorted, vestigial optimism to be found in the work of Samuel Beckett. “Can’t 
translate, must translate,” say (adapting the end of The Unnameable), or “Fail again. Fail better” 
(Worstward Ho). Such an understanding posits translatability as what one might call in Kantian 
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vocabulary a regulative idea: in principle unattainable, yet governing one’s attempts to approach 
it from the here-below, always approximately, asymptotically. 
 
Conclusion 
This brings me to my conclusion. Following Cassin, the Franco-German co-editors of a recent 
collection on untranslatability define the term (in a defiantly bilingual introduction) as “not the 
symptom of a failure in translation but an event that is constitutive of the act of translating” (“pas 
le symptôme d’un échec de la traduction mais un événement constitutif de l’acte de traduire” / 
“nicht das Symptom eines Scheiterns der Übersetzung, sondern ein Ereignis, das für den Akt der 
Übersetzung konstitutiv ist”: Dünne et al. 2013, 4, 10). And in turn, in a well-known passage 
from his essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” on “the redoubtable, irreducible difficulty of translation,” 
Derrida defines a certain kind of translation (“a violent difficulty in the transference of a 
nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme”) as constitutive of the practice of philosophy itself 
(Derrida 2004, 77). Translation and philosophy are integrally interwined, and untranslatability is 
philosophy’s gift to translation (in all the ambiguous senses of that word). But if the concept of 
untranslatability did not exist, would it be necessary to invent it? Louis Kelly strikes at the heart 
of the debate when he points out: “Whether translation is possible or not, turns on the concept 
one has of fidelity” (Kelly 1979, 216-17), since fidelity is the standard criterion for evaluations 
of translation success or failure. And it is precisely for this reason that Lawrence Venuti rejects 
the very debate over notions of “translatability” and “untranslatability” as vitiated by an 




If one reviews the history of notions of translatability and untranslatability in translation 
theory, then one is tempted to conclude that it boils down to a question of faith and a matter of 
temperament, in other words whether one is a “glass half full” or a “glass half empty” kind of 
person. No prizes for guessing which of those Schopenhauer was, for example, with his 
positively tragic view of the translator’s dilemma, while on the other hand a focus on Quine and 
Davidson allows Kirsten Malmkjær to subscribe to what one might call the Whig or progressivist 
view of the history of translation theory, summed up in her claim: “The philosophy of translation 
shows us that translation is always possible” (Malmkjær 2010, 216). Malmkjær concludes her 
contribution to this volume by arguing that Jakobson and Davidson act as an antidote to the 
putatively paralysing effect of the notion of untranslatability, which no longer serves as an 
obstacle but rather as a “concept of investigation.” Other contributions to this volume, similarly, 
disarm the notion of untranslatability and argue that it should instead be substituted or 
superseded by a notion of provisionality (Theo Hermans) or indeterminacy (Philip Wilson). 
As a practising translator I share in this emerging consensus, but I am also minded not 
just to let untranslatability go, and to grant it more than a merely historical or heuristic value. 
Using Cassin I would want translatability to remain a kind of regulative idea, with 
untranslatability a constant but salutary provocation to the translator so that we are not tempted 
to repress it in a kind of misplaced triumphalism. For as I was suggesting earlier, when repressed 
it has an uncanny knack of returning to haunt you. Already in The Translation Zone, Emily Apter 
warns us against making the simplistic move from “Nothing is Translatable” to “Everything is 
Translatable” (Apter 2006, 85-93), and her subsequent strictures against the concept of “world 
literature” have relied on a notion of untranslatability that still has significant purchase (Apter 
2013). The German Romantics, I have been suggesting, constituted a concept of untranslatability 
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with a powerful sense of peculiarity at its core, and a recognition of this peculiarity is essential to 
acknowledging the other in their fullest humanity. In this sense untranslatability can be viewed 
as not a curse but a blessing – it reminds us that translation is always hard, but it lends translation 
a tragic nobility. It leads the translator not to throw up their hands in despair; instead, it energises 
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